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AVERROES' PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF SEPARATE 
INTELLECT AND GOD' 
Richard C. TAYLOR 
The goal of this article is to make a modest contribution to our 
understanding of the thought of A verroes on the natures of God and 
separate intellects to the extent that the methodologies of the philosophical 
sciences were considered by him to be able to contribute to the human 
enterprise of grasping the Divine. Now, insofar as Averroes, like Aristotle 
before him, held that God is immaterial intellect and complete actuality, it 
will be necessary to explore the nature of intellect and how it is that 
Averroes, unlike Aristotle before him, held that God, the first of all intellects, 
is much more than just the first in a hierarchy of similar metaphysical 
actualities called intellects or intelligences. For A verroes God is no primum 
inter pares as one might argue is the position of Aristotle who asserts there 
to be a plurality of deities or separate intellects2. Rather, for Averroes, God 
transcends all other entities which themselves possess an otherness3 that 
enables A verroes to call God the unique First Agent, the First Form, the 
First Principle, indeed, the First Cause, One not like other entities. To 
express this otherness found in the immaterial separate intellects below God, 
Averroes claimed something never found in Aristotle, namely that separate 
immaterial intellects other than God contain an aspect of potency even while 
they are in their own natures completely actual intellects. This notion, as will 
be recounted below, allowed A verroes a way to distinguish all other 
intellects from God, but only at the cost of the introduction of metaphysical 
and epistemological principles not found in Aristotle. What is the source and 
foundation for his assertion of this new metaphysical doctrine that some sort 
of potency in fact exists in what is wholly immaterial and wholly actual? The 
1 I am grateful to the Rev. Thaddeus Burch, Dean of the Graduate School and Chair 
of the Committee on Research, and also to the Department of Philosophy of Marquette 
University for funding asssistance which made my participation in this conference 
possible. I am also grateful to David Twetten, Josep Puig Montada, Michael Marmura 
and Deborah Black for reading this paper and sharing with me their suggestions for its 
ameliorization. 
2 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1073 b 2-1074 a 17. 
3 To phrase this in another more familiar way, other things of the world are really 
related to God but God bears no real relation to them. 
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answer to this question is to be found in his psychology from which he 
draws this central metaphysical conception. 
There are two parts to my account of the thought of A verroes following 
the outline of ideas just presented. First, I will explain the foundations of this 
doctrine of potency in separate, immaterial intellects and its arguments 
found in the Long Commentary on the De anima. Secondly, I will explain 
the role played in the metaphysics of separate substances by this doctrine of 
potency in separate intellects and God. In this second section, I will also 
consider the philosophical consequences of these doctrines with respect to 
A verroes' philosophical understanding of the nature of God. 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF INTELLEC-r4 
In a number of philosophical works Averroes states clearly and directly 
that essential principles of Metaphysics are established in Psychology, that is, 
the Science of the Soul. 
(i) In his early Epitome of the Metaphysics, Averroes sets forth the 
understanding that the method which establishes the nature of the existence 
of the separate, immaterial intellectual principles - the separate intellects -
affecting the movement of the heavens is determined in the Science of the 
Soul. There he goes on to say that most of the principles employed in the 
Science of Metaphysics are taken from the Science of the Soul and that the 
knowledge garnered in the Science of the Soul is essential for there to be 
any knowledge of the sort of existence which the separate intellects have5; 
(ii) In his Long Commentary on the De caelo, he writes that demonstrations 
concerning the celestial bodies and their movers in the Science of the 
Heavens or Cosmology are based on principles taken from Natural Science 
and Metaphysics. Natural Science, he says, shows that the movers of the 
celestial bodies do not exist in matter, while the Science of the Soul provides 
an understanding of both intellect and desire. For intelligible forms do not 
cause motion in human beings without desire which arises as a consequence 
of intellectual understanding. Hence, just as human beings are moved to 
action only insofar as imagination presents the intelligible as an object of 
imagination and thereby as an object of desire, analogously the eternally 
moving celestial bodies must possess desire and they must then also 
4 
This topic is explored in detail in R.C. Taylor, "Averroes on psychology and the 
principles of metaphysics", Journal of the History of Philosophy 36.4 ( 1998): 19-35. 5 
Averroes, Talkhi,1' Ma ba'da al-tabi'a, ed. 'U. Amin, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1958), 
pp. 135-6. German translation by S. van den Bergh, Die Epitome der Metaphvsik 
des Averroes (Leiden, 1924), p. 117. See Appendix, item (i). 
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Commentary on the De anima, Averroes explains Aristotle's remarks about 
the importance of the Science of the Soul saying, 
Because we hold that knowledge concerns things which are honorable and 
desirable and that such things surpass one another on account of the 
confirmation associated with demonstration, on account of the nobility of 
the subject, or on account of both, as we find in the science of the soul, 
because in these two respects it surpasses [all] other sciences, except for 
divine science9, we must hold that the science of the soul comes before the 
other sciences; and for this reason we placed it in a position of priority 
among all subjects of inquiry 10. 
He then goes on to explain that the Science of the Soul provides impor-
tant assistance to the other sciences (a) by providing knowledge about what 
is noblest among all the objects of Natural Science, namely soul in living 
things; (b) by supplying principles such as the nature of human beings and 
their end for moral science and such as the knowledge "that separate forms 
are intelligences, and also many other things concerning the knowledge of 
states consequent upon intelligence considered as intelligence and intellect"; 
and (c) by confirming propositions about first principles with knowledge 
about the causes of those propositions, since knowledge through the cause 
conveys more certainty than only know ledge of the fad 1• 
position of A verroes in this passage plays a key role in the argument of Taylor, "A verroes 
on psychology and the principles of metaphysics". 
9 That is, metaphysics. The full text of the Long Commentary on the De anima 
exists only in Latin. See Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis 
De anima libros, ed. F.S. Crawford (Cambridge, 1953). Hereafter cited as LCDA (Long 
Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle). The Arabic original exists only in 
fragments. See A. Ben Chahida in "Iktishiif al-na~~ al-'arabi li-ahamm ajza' al-sharl_J al-
kabir li-Kitab al-Nafs ta'lif Abi al-Walid ibn Rushd", al-lfayat al-thaqafiyya 35 (1985): 
14-48. There are extant Arabic fragments corresponding to I 1.32-33. See Ben Chahida, 
p. 29. 
10 
"Et quasi dicit: et quia nos opinamur quod cognitio est de rebus honorabilibus et 
delectabilibus, et quod superant se adinvicem aut propter confirmationem demonstrationis 
aut propter nobilitatem subiecti aut propter utrunque, sicut invenimus in scientia de anima, 
scilicet quia superat in his duobus alias scientias, preter scientiam Divinam, necessarium 
est opinari quod scientia ani me antecedit alias scientias; et ideo posuimus earn inter omnia 
quesita positione precedenti" (LCDA, I c.2, p. 4). 
11 
"Et debes scire quod iuvamentum scientie anime ad alias scientias invenitur tribus 
modis. Quorum unus est secundum quod est pars illius scientie, immo nobilissima 
partium eius, sicut habet dispositionem cum scientia Naturali. Animalia enim sunt 
nobilissima corporum generabilium et corruptibilium; anima autem est nobilius omnibus 
que sunt in animalibus. Secundum est quia dat pluribus scientiis plura principia, ut 
scientie Morali, scilicet regendi civitates, et Divine. Moralis enim suscipit ab hac scientia 
ultimum finem hominis in eo quod est homo, et scientiam sue substantie que sit. Divinus 
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What the Science of Soul most importantly establishes for A verroes is 
that it is not impossible for a wholly immaterial intellect neverthele_ss to have 
a certain potency within it. He comes to this view by way of his famous 
doctrine of the separate Material Intellect in which all human knowers ~hare. 
On his account of human knowing, it is necessary that the actuality of 
knowledge come to exist in a separate, immaterial Intellect _as ~ ~onsequence 
of contributions from the sensory and cogitative powers of mdividual human 
beings. The process is one which begins in s~ns~ pe~ception, employs the 
activities of the powers of imagination and cogitation, mvolves ~he presenta-
tion of denuded images of particular forms before the abstracttve P?wer of 
the Agent Intellect, and concludes with the realization ~f ~mmaten~l-non-
particular intentions in the separate Materi~l Int;llect: Thi~ IS ~he actlVlty ~f 
conceptualization by intellect, ta$awwur bz-al- aql, zmagznatw ~r formatw 
per intellectum 12 • While the explication of _Averroes' ~octr~n~ of the 
Material Intellect is not the chief focus of this presentatiOn, It IS worth 
pointing out that his teachings on this topic result fro~ his ~areful study ~f 
the Greek tradition of Aristotelian commentary and m particular from his 
critical reflections on the work of Themistius. Those critical reflections can 
be distilled into two propositions to which his reflection~ conc~ude?· From 
these propositions, the doctrine of the Material Intellect ans~s. First, mtel~ec­
tual understanding, that is, knowledge of what we call umversals, req~Ires 
that it be received into something which is not a "this", a particula~, smce 
reception into a particular would render knowledge particular, not umversal. 
Second, the unity of science requires that there be a common referent ~or 
the universals of scientific discourse, something which precludes there exis-
autem suscipit ab ea substantiam sui subiecti. Hi_c_ enim _decl~r~bitur quoniam fo:me 
abstracte sunt intelligentie, et alia multa de cogmt10ne dispos~tiOnum consequentmm 
intelligentiam in eo quod est intellige~~ia et_ intell:ctus_. Tert1~m- v_:r~ est ~~:~:~: 
iuvamentum et est facere acquirere conhrmatiOnem m pnm1s pnnCipns.' q~oma 
' · · · · · I · er suam 
acquiritur cognitio causarum pnmarum propositiOnum, et cogmt1o a Icmus P · 
causam est magis firma quam sui esse tantum" (LCDA, I c._2. PP· 4-5). 
12 The sole occurrence of ymaginatio per intellectum m the LCDA occurs at I c.3, 
p. 6. The Arabic tasawwur bi-al- 'aql, "conceptualization by intellect", is found m the 
corresponding pas~age of the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's de Amma, ed. 
A.L. Ivry (Cairo, 1994), p. 2.5. The phrase, ymaginatio per tntellectum, IS us~d 
frequently to render the Arabic tasawwur bi-al- 'aql in the Long Commentary on t e 
· - M- b 'd b-' t Book Metaphysics, Book Lam. See, for example, Averroes, Tafw a a at-t~ 1 a • . 
Lam, pp. 1599-1600; Aristotelis Metaphysu:orum lzbn XII II, XII, c.37, 3 I 9 ~ ·. 
Genequand tr., p. 151. Later in Book III of the LCDA the phrase formare P11 
intellectum, "to conceptualize by intellect", is used to convey this notiOn. See LCDA · 
pp. 379-82, 384, 391, 400, 408-9, 434 and 446. 
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per intellectum 12 • While the explication of _Averroes' ~octr~n~ of the 
Material Intellect is not the chief focus of this presentatiOn, It IS worth 
pointing out that his teachings on this topic result fro~ his ~areful study ~f 
the Greek tradition of Aristotelian commentary and m particular from his 
critical reflections on the work of Themistius. Those critical reflections can 
be distilled into two propositions to which his reflection~ conc~ude?· From 
these propositions, the doctrine of the Material Intellect ans~s. First, mtel~ec­
tual understanding, that is, knowledge of what we call umversals, req~Ires 
that it be received into something which is not a "this", a particula~, smce 
reception into a particular would render knowledge particular, not umversal. 
Second, the unity of science requires that there be a common referent ~or 
the universals of scientific discourse, something which precludes there exis-
autem suscipit ab ea substantiam sui subiecti. Hi_c_ enim _decl~r~bitur quoniam fo:me 
abstracte sunt intelligentie, et alia multa de cogmt10ne dispos~tiOnum consequentmm 
intelligentiam in eo quod est intellige~~ia et_ intell:ctus_. Tert1~m- v_:r~ est ~~:~:~: 
iuvamentum et est facere acquirere conhrmatiOnem m pnm1s pnnCipns.' q~oma 
' · · · · · I · er suam 
acquiritur cognitio causarum pnmarum propositiOnum, et cogmt1o a Icmus P · 
causam est magis firma quam sui esse tantum" (LCDA, I c._2. PP· 4-5). 
12 The sole occurrence of ymaginatio per intellectum m the LCDA occurs at I c.3, 
p. 6. The Arabic tasawwur bi-al- 'aql, "conceptualization by intellect", is found m the 
corresponding pas~age of the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's de Amma, ed. 
A.L. Ivry (Cairo, 1994), p. 2.5. The phrase, ymaginatio per tntellectum, IS us~d 
frequently to render the Arabic tasawwur bi-al- 'aql in the Long Commentary on t e 
· - M- b 'd b-' t Book Metaphysics, Book Lam. See, for example, Averroes, Tafw a a at-t~ 1 a • . 
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ting a plurality of different material intellects, since in that case each intellect 
would have its own intelligibles in act13. 
From this A verroes concludes that all human beings share in a single, 
separate Material Intellect. He further concludes that the unique Material 
Intellect in fact must contain some potency, insofar as it is receptive of 
intelligibles in act thanks to the cogitative powers of human beings and 
thanks to the abstractive powers of the separate Agent Intellect. That 
potency on the part of the Material Intellect is a directed passive potency for 
the reception of intelligibles in act. By its reception the Material Intellect 
becomes further actualized as intellect and it is this in which individual 
human beings share. Note that what the Material Intellect receives is an 
immaterial, intelligible intention, an intelligible in act, and that it receives the 
intelligible not as a particular, a "this", but insofar as it is the sole Material 
Intellect in which all humans share. This sort of reception is required by the 
very nature of intellectual understanding and by the approach A verroes has 
elected to follow in his account of intellect. 
For the purposes of this article, two consequences need to be noted. 
First, by this account on the part of A verroes the Science of the Soul has 
been shown to require that the concept of immaterial intellect as a fully 
actual being can also allow for the inclusion of the notion of a certain 
potentiality in the genus of knowing. The Material Intellect is intellect and 
yet must include a note of passive potency with respect to its knowing. This 
separately existing substance, the Material Intellect, is unique in its special 
nature as knower and is so intimately involved with human beings that it is 
in a significant sense even included in the definition of human beings insofar 
as human beings are rational animals 14• This is made all the more clear when 
A verroes describes the Material Intellect as in potency all the forms of the 
world: "[T]he Material Intellect is what is in potency all the intentions of 
universal material forms[ ... ]" 15• To this extent the Material Intellect, lowest 
in the hierarchy of separate intellects for A verroes, is unique as being the 
sole intellect which has a nature which bears an essential relationship to 
13 
This is discussed in greater detail in Taylor, "Averroes on psychology and the 
princples of metaphysics", pp. 23-5. 
1 
"The purpose of man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, is that he ascend to" the 
level of "the intelligibles of the theoretical sciences [ ... ]" "[F]or the theoretical sciences 
[ ... ] are of all things the strongest, the most free of matter, to the point that they are 
thought to be in a manner everlasting. [ ... ] But this kind of perfection - i.e., the moral, is 
laid down fin relation to] theoretical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which the 
attainment of the end is impossible" (Averroes On Plato's Republic, tr. R. Lerner [Ithaca, 1974], pp. R8, 92). 
15 
"[ ... ] [I]ntellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones 
fonnarum materialium univcrsalium [ ... ]" (LCDA, HI c.5, p. 387). 
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Metaphysics and to adopt a cosmological scheme which continues to 
employ "the terminology of emanation in the Tahafut [al-Tahafut] largely 
as a metaphor", as Barry Kogan has described it 18 . In accord with astrono-
mical observations and the Science of Cosmology, Averroes wishes to 
maintain that the cosmos is constructed in a hierarchy of celestial bodies and 
associated separate intellects which are the causes of the motions of these 
celestial bodies. These motions occur because of the activity of conceptuali-
zation by intellect19• The existence of the celestial bodies is confirmed by 
empirical observation, but the existence of their separate intellectual movers 
is something which is argued in Natural Science. This is the conclusion of an 
argument founded on the notions that infinite power cannot be contained in 
a finite body and that infinite power is what is required to account for the 
eternal motion essential to the nature of the celestial bodies20. As Davidson 
puts it: 
The heavens must instead be construed as a body of a completely different 
type, consisting in the association of a simple matter-like substratum in 
motion, and an independently existing immaterial form moving the 
substratum. The matter-like substratum exists necessarily by virtue of itself, 
and the form is a source of infinite power whereby the substratum moves 
eternally21 . 
While it is on the basis of these Aristotelian considerations and not 
because of an adoption of an explicitly Avicennian or Neoplatonic scheme of 
emanation that A verroes asserts the existence of a plurality of separate 
intellects, the description of this by Davidson casts the doctrine in Plotinian 
terms. 
A verroes is suggesting that each intelligence has some stratum of existence 
in its own right, a stratum that one of his later works does expressly 
recognize as a quasi-material aspect of the incorporeal intelligence. The 
inchoate aspect of the intelligence eternally turns its intellectual gaze, as it 
were, upon the First Cause. The conception it thereby gains becomes its 
eternal form, the form through which it receives perfection in proportion to 
its rank in the hierarchy of existence. We may conjecture that, in Averroes' 
18 
B. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany, 1985) 
p. 252; H.A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their 
Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford, 
1992), pp. 228ff. 
19 
See Averroes, Tafsir Ma ha 'd ar-tahr'at, Book Liim, p. 1600; Aristotelis 
Metaphysicorum libri XIII/, XII, c.37, 319 H; Genequand tr., p. 151. 20 
Davidson, On Intellect, p. 325. 
21 /hid., p. 325. 
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existence through its conception of the correspon mg m e Igen . 
This account particularly with its metaphors of stratum, turning ~nd 
. g does not ~onvey with sufficient clarity the nature of the metaphysical ~:.~~d~rations at stake. In his mature ~cc~unts which reject t~e use. of th_~ 
t" n of efficient or creative causality m the realm of separate mtelh 
no 10 23 these intelligences are characterized as simple, substanti~l, se~arate r~:.~swhich are intelligible per se. !hey ~e intelligible ~nd also mtelhgent, 
that is they are intelligible entities m their own n_atures mdependent _of ~~y 
other knowers, for a form which exists in actuality ~s a separate pnncip e 
has to be an intellect24. As such, these should conta~n no potency what~o-
The sort of receptive or passive potency attnbuted to the Matenal ~:t~;iect in,its relation to the Agent Intellect by the Scien~e o~ t~e Sou~ha~ 
no lace here. In contrast to the Material Intelle~t w_hich Is m nee o inte~tions from the sublunary realm for its actuahz_atwn, these separate 
intellectual substances do not receive forms from outside themselves by t~~ 
sort of efficient causality which takes place in. the ~as~ of t~e ~a ten a 
Intellect. For the separate intellects which are self-Idenhcalm_ theu bemg ~nd 
their actuality of knowing to the extent that they do not h~erally rece~ve 
anything from outside themselves, the attribution of receptive ?r ~asstve 
otency does not follow. Certainly the activity of c~nceptu~hzatwn by 
fntellect (tasawwur hi-al- 'aql, ymaginatio or formatzo per zntellectu~) 
which is attributed by A verroes to the Material Intellect and t~ the celesttal 
bodies somehow since they move by desire, cann_ot be attnbuted t~ th~ 
separate intellects except as an account of theu own self-contame 
immanent activity. . . · · 1 
The solution which A verroes proposes for these dtfftculttes mvo v~s ~ 
reiteration of the doctrine of potency in separate substan~es but n?w as a 
doctrine of a potency for an immanent activity of knowmg. In hts Long 
Commentary on the De anima he writes, 
as sensible being is divided into form and matter, intelligible ~eing_ m~st ~~ 
divided into things similar to these two, namely into some~hmg stm!lar_
1 form and into something similar to matte~. Thi~ is lsometh~ng] n~ce~:~l ~­
present in every separate intelligence whtch thmks somethmg else. . 
not then there would be no multiplicity { 410} in separate forms. And _Lt wa~ alr~ady explained in First Philosophy that there is no form absolutely tree o 
22 !hid., pp. 227-8. In a footnote Dav1 son sugges s · .d ·t a comparison with Plotinus, 
Enneads 1.7.1 and 1.8.2. 23 
Ibid., pp. 228-9. . · f h si-s" p 27 24 See Taylor, "Averroes on psychology and the pnnnples o metap Y· c. , · · 
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Commentary on the De anima he writes, 
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divided into things similar to these two, namely into some~hmg stm!lar_
1 form and into something similar to matte~. Thi~ is lsometh~ng] n~ce~:~l ~­
present in every separate intelligence whtch thmks somethmg else. . 
not then there would be no multiplicity { 410} in separate forms. And _Lt wa~ alr~ady explained in First Philosophy that there is no form absolutely tree o 
22 !hid., pp. 227-8. In a footnote Dav1 son sugges s · .d ·t a comparison with Plotinus, 
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Ibid., pp. 228-9. . · f h si-s" p 27 24 See Taylor, "Averroes on psychology and the pnnnples o metap Y· c. , · · 
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potency except the First For h. h d . 
Its essence is Its quiddity (e~ wt ~c ~n erstan~s .nothmg outside Itself25. 
en za ezus est quzdltas eius) Oth f 
;owe:er, are in soll_le way different in quiddity and essence26 If .ter orms, 
or this genus of bemgs which we have come t k . . I were not 
soul, we could not understand multi r .t . o now m.the science of the 
that, unless we know here the natur: ~~Ityh ~~ sepllarate thmgs, to the extent 
th . e mte ect, we cannot know th t e separate movmg powers ought to be intellects27. a 
But how are we to understand this since God t . . ~n~ yet separate intellect was said to contain potency~~~s sera~ate Intellect 
~Ie /m th.e un~ers~anding of conceptualization by int~llec~, s~~~::~;e;;:_sa~o 
aq or tmagmatw or formatio per intell I . . -th~ separate intellects, their true under~~~:;;~g ~~g~es.t that m the case of 
r:~~~~~~~g ~·:.'~:d;~~~~;~~·~;~,:~~~~:~:c~ i~\~~~::~;~:1:g~ 
e measure . That Is to say th . . . 
knowing of themsel f ' ey contam Withm their very 
ves are erence to som th. ·d 
namely the First Form, the Final Cause of all e mg out~I. e of themselves, 
of conceptualization by intellect do ' God. T~eir Immanent activity 
themselves and as such is not solei es ~ot contai~ only reference to 
natures. To this extent th y detennmed by theu own self-contained 
self-conceptualization co~a~~~ ~~~ ~::~;~~:~~nads, f~~ their a~tivity ~f 
natures God This then I·s th . . somet mg outside their 
' · ' ' e manner m which A 
note of potency tied to the nature of their activ ve':oes. can sa~ that. a 
separate intellects other than G d . f e knowmg Is contamed m 
"receive" from God somethin o~ th I.nso ar as t~ey 2~ust. refer to and so 
forth in the Taha-~"utal-Taha•+..gt h eihr self~knowmg . This doctrine is put 
'1' ':fU, w en e wntes: 
25 Th' "F. 
26 
18 Irst Form" is God for Averroes. 
For A verroes God is pure actuality fa . h +:' 
Ma ba 'd ar-!abi'at, Book Liim c 37 ' 1-tnna u Jl lun malz(iun (Averroes, Tafsir 
however, that the Latin translation o~it' P·. 599.7; Geneq~and ~r., p. 151). Note, 
libri /fliii, XII c.37, fol. 319v G-H. s this phrase. Cf. Anstotelzs Metaphysicorum 
LCDA, III c.5, pp. 409-10 M tr I . . . 
more worthy and more noble than. ot: ·~ns .atwn. This Is why the study of the soul is 
our understanding of intellect in ou ~rl s udies and should precede others. It is through 
higher beings. rse ves that we are able to understand intellect in 
28 I .. 
n cntJque of A verroes, however h . . . 
potency to all intellects on the basis of h' note .t at t~ere IS an eqmvocatwn in attributing 
A verroes' view' the potency in th M ~ ~ ~olnsJderati?n of th~ Material Intellect, since, on 
way of cogitations from parti.cul e h a enab ~telle~t Is a passive potency for receiving by 
f ar uman emgs Ill con. t. . h . . . rom the Agent Intellect Th tt .b . · . . JUnc Ion Wit effiCient causality 
· e a n utwn of active 1m potency--: to separate intellects is based on other consi ma~ent potency ~ ~ot passive 
separate, Immaterial intellectual and inteiii. t • . deratwns such as their nature as 
. gen torms Because f th' . . 
not stnctly correct that the potency discovered in th c. • o IS eqmvocatwn it is 
e case of the Matenal Intellect can be 
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The difference between the First's understanding of Itself and the 
understanding of themselves which the rest of the intellects have is that the 
First Intellect understands Itself as existing through Itself, not as what is 
related to a cause, while the rest of the intellects understand themselves as 
being related to their cause so that plurality enters into these in this way. 
For it is not necessary that they all be in one grade of simplicity since they 
are not in a single grade in regard to the First Principle and none of them 
exists simply in the sense in which the First is simple, because the First is 
considered to exist by Itself, while they are in related existence29. 
And to distinguish the separate intellects other than the First Principle 
from one another, A verroes appeals to proximity to the First. Yet for 
immaterial entities such as these, proximity has to be understood in terms of 
simplicity of the activity which is one with their essences, that is, in terms of 
greater or lesser simplicity of their activity of understanding. 
It is not necessary that the existence of the intellect and the intelligible in 
separate intellects as one and the same be such that they are all equal in 
simplicity. For [the philosophers] hold that in this notion the intellects 
surpass [one another] to greater or lesser degrees and that this [simplicity] 
exists in reality only in the First Intellect. The reason for this is that the 
essence of the First Intellect is subsistent per se, while the rest of the 
said to be the same which is present in all separate intellects other than God. Those 
separate intellects may have potency but it is a potency of a radically different kind, an 
active immanent potency. This Averroes does perhaps because he needs a new 
understanding to account for the hierarchy of intelligences and the distinction of 
intelligences from God, that is, to avoid asserting a plurality of essentially co-equal 
deities. But this is an issue which I will have to pursue elsewhere. 
29 Averroes, Tahafot at-tahafot, ed. M. Bouyges, S.J. (Beirut, 1930), p. 204. 
My translation. See Appendix, item (iv) for the Arabic text. "[ ... ] [T]he difference 
between the knowledge of the First Principle, as knowing itself, and the knowledge of 
the other principles, as knowing themselves, is that the First Principle thinks itself as 
existing by itself, not as being related to a cause, whereas the other intellects think 
themselves as related to their cause and in this way plurality is introduced into them. They 
need not all have the same degree of simplicity, since they are not of the same rank in 
relation to the First Principle and none of them is simple in the sense in which the First 
Principle is simple, because the First Principle is regarded as an existence by itself 
whereas they are in related existence". Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence 
of the Incoherence), translated by S. van den Bergh (London, 1969), p. 122; 
Averroes, Tafsrr Mii ba'd at-{ahf'at, Book Lam, pp. 1696-7; Aristotelis 
Metaphysicorum Lihri Xlll/, XII, c.5l, 335H; Genequand tr., pp. 192-3, where 
Averroes follows Aristotle in stressing that what requires something other than itself is 
less than the most excellent of all entities. 
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intellects understand by their essences that they subsist through [the First 
Intellect] 30. 
In the case of God's knowing, He is completely free of both passive 
potency and active immanent potency since His knowing contains within 
itself all its references. Within His being and knowing there is no otherness. 
While the other separate intellects must conceptualize in an intellectual way 
something which is outside of their own natures, God need not and cannot 
carry out such an activity. Indeed, this doctrine entails that this sort of 
conceptualization by intellect is not an activity found in God since there is 
nothing other than Himself to conceptualize and His very conceptualizing is 
fully and completely identical to His being31 . In this way for A verroes God 
30 Averroes, Tahafot at-tahafot, p. 204. My translation. See Appendix, item (v) 
for the Arabic text. "It does not follow from the fact that intellect and the thing known are 
identical in the separate intellects that they are all similar in simplicity, for in this, 
according to the philosophers, some are superior to others in a greater or lesser degree; 
absolute simplicity is only found in the First Intellect, and the reason is that the essence of 
the First Intellect is subsistent by itself, and the other intellects, when they think 
themselves, are conscious that they subsist by it[ ... ]" (van den Bergh tr., p. 123). This 
understanding of God and separate intellect was followed by Siger of Brabant who relied 
on the account in Averroes' Long Commentary on the Metaphysics at Averroes, Tafsir 
Mii ba 'd a{-{abi'at, Book Lam, pp. 1704-6; Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XII II, 
XII, c.51, 336 G-M; Genequand tr., p. 196. Siger writes: "Certum est quod in intellectu 
sit aliqua potentia, cum non sit actus purus in fine simplicitatis, in quo non est aliqua 
compositio. Nam, si in actu primo esset compositio, in eo esset imperfectio, quia non 
potest componi ex duobus actibus: dicit enim Aristote1es septimo Metaphysicae quod 
actus separat. Oporteret ergo quod componeretur ex materia et forma, vel ex uno actu 
materiali et reliquo formali, et sic in eo esset de potentia, cum in eo esset de 
imperfectione. Et propter hoc in actu primo, cum sit in fine simplicitatis, non potuit esse 
compositio. Alia vero omnia, quae a sua simplicitate recedunt, compositionem aliquam 
recipiunt. Dicit enim Dionysius quod monadem sequitur dyas, et Boethius, quod omne 
quod est citra Primum, habet suum quod est. Ideo cum intellectus a puro actu Primi 
recedat et simplicitate, oportet quod aliquam compositionem habeat" (In tertium de 
anima, Q.6, solutio, in Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in tertium de anima, De anima 
intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi, ed. Bernardo Bazan [Louvain/Paris, 1972], 
pp. 18-19). This text is cited by R.C. Dales in the course of his discussion of Siger' s 
understanding of the soul in The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth 
Century (Leiden, 1995), p. 135, n. 43. 
31 On the issue of God's knowledge, see Th.-A. Druart, "Averroes on God's 
knowledge of being qua being", in P. Lockey (ed.), Studies in Thomistic Theology 
(Houston, 1995), pp. 175-205. Averroes does not hesitate to state that God's knowledge 
is radically different from that of all other entities and that it is neither universal nor 
particular. See Averroes, Tahafot at-taha.fot, pp. 226-7; tr. van den Bergh, pp. 136-7; 
and Long Commentary on the Metaphysics at Averroes, Ta.fsir Mii ha 'd at-{ahi'at, 
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h · ue Final Cause of all and in no is no primum inter pares but rather t e umq 
manner dependent upon another. 
APPENDIX 
.. "Omne enim habens figuram terminatam quod in loco mo:etur, est anima~um 
(u) . lestia sunt huiusmodi. Et haec est declaratiO secunda quomam neces::~~~~~~~~:; d~~~aratio quid. Demonstratio enim_ si_mil~ter in hac scientia fundata ~~a~ per propositi ones acceptas ex scientia naturali et divmah. Declaratumt ~m~b est~~ 
. . r co orum coelestia non est in materia. Et declaratum es m I ro_ ~~:~~~~~~l~~t~uod ~st huiusmodi est intellectus. Et dec~aratum est i~ tract~tu ~n~o 
quod forma intelligibilis non movetur nisi secundum desydenum quod fit a s~o mt~ ~c u: 
ro ter necesse est ut habeat suum imaginatum et est corpus coe este_. a ens 
Qduapd ~ " (Arz'stotelis De caelo cum Averrois Cordubensis commentarus Ill In 
esy enum .. · 1562] 1 V II c 61 Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentanzs [Vemce, ' vo. ' . . 
fol.140B-D. . - '']K't-b lSamii'waal-In his Epitome of the De caelo, Averroes wntes ([Jawaml I a a.- . d b G 
'iilam in Rasii'il Ibn Rushd [Hyderabad, 1947], 41.16-19. This text IS cite y . 
Endress in "Averroes' De Caelo", p. 28): ~ ~ . . . I L,.;.,\ [ ] 
·I dll:A I: d dl~_, ~~~~_\.II~~~ J.A.J~ J~ .u\0;;:-> 0 - ... 
0 '-"=" \ - ~.~q~ \110 ~~... ~ :y ~WI o~ y. \..._, ~ y. .!.l f'<A Jl 0r-- ~ ~ _ r_ 
u-- )~ . 0 JJ.r<> 
h _, d M Bouyges S 1 2nd ed., vol. II (iii) Averroes, Taf~ir Mii ba 'd at-ta 1 at, e · · · • · ·• 
(Beirut, 1967), Book Lam c.36, p. 1593: 
Book Uim, pp. 1707-8; Aristotelis Metaphvsicorum lihri XIII/, XII, c.51, 337 A-C: 
tr. Genequand, pp. 197-8. 
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IBN RUSHD ET SA CRITIQUE D'IBN BAJJA 
(DANS LE GRA~D COMMENTAIRE SUR LE DE ANIMA) 
Jules JANSSENS 
INTRODUCTION : LA CRITIQUE RUSHDIENNE ENVERS LES << MODERN! >> 
Dans son Grand commentaire sur le De anima, Ibn Rushd affirrne : 
Ce qui a fait errer cet homme (Avempace, i. e. Ibn Bajja), et nous aussi long-
temps (Iongo tempore-DL: il y a longtemps), c'est que les « Modernes » 
laissent de cote les livres d' Aristote et examinent (plutot) ceux des commen-
tateurs- principalement pour l'Ame, car ils pensent que ce livre est impos-
sible a comprendre. Et tout cela est la faute d' Avicenne qui n'a imite 
Aristote que dans sa Dialectique (a notre avis, il s'agit de toute la logique, 
et pas seulement du livre de ce titre), mais qui a erre dans toutle reste, parti-
culierement dans la Metaphysique, car il a, pour ainsi dire, (re)commence (a 
partir de lui-meme) 1• 
A premiere vue, il n'y a rien d'etrange dans ces affirmations. N'est-il 
pas une verite universellement reconnue que les ecrits anciens posent 
d'enormes problemes d'interpretation? Que dans le cas d'un texte 
1 Averroes Cordubensis, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, 
ed. F. Crawford, CCAA Lat., I, 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 470, 41-8 (abrege 
GC). Traduction fran'<aise annotee par A. de Libera, Averroes. L'intelligence et Ia 
pensee. Grand Commentaire duDe anima livre III (Paris, 1998), p. 139 (abrege DL). 
Specifions que l' expression « Iongo tempore >> est selon no us fondamentalement 
ambigue. Comme DL on peut Ia comprendre comme signifiant : « il y a longtemps >>, et 
alors Ibn Rushd n'aurait temoigne une confiance exageree dans les « Commentatcurs >> 
que durant une breve periode de sa pensee (plus ou moins a l'epoque de la redaction de la 
majorite des Compendia, a sa voir vers 1159 -pour un essai de chronologie de I' cxuvre 
rushdienne, voir M. Cruz Hernandez, Abu al-Walid Mu/:tammad ibn Ru.~d (Averroes). 
Vida, Obra, Pensamiento, Influencia, 2' ed. [Cordoba, 1997], pp. 57-60). Toutefois, 
il nous parait possible d'entendre !'expression latine dans le sens de« longtemps >>. Cela 
impliquerait qu'Ibn Rushd ne s'est pas si vite defait de son admiration pour les 
« Commentateurs >>, qu'il avait faite sienne a Ia suite de ses predecesseurs arabcs. Une 
confirmation dans ce sens se trouve dans son Commentaire moyen sur lcs Topiques ou il 
n'hesite pas a introduire des elements essentiels derives des « Commentateurs >>, bien 
que ceux-ci ne figurassent pas dans I' Epitome sur le meme ouvrage -voir ici mcme 
A. Hasnawi, «La topique de l' accident chez Averroes : de I 'Abrege de logique au 
Commentaire moyen sur les Topiques >>. 
